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Revisiting the Mutual Embeddedness of Culture and Mental Illness
Abstract
In this paper, we discuss the intricate relationship between culture and mental illness. Our
central position is that there cannot be mental illness without culture. We argue that our
limited knowledge to the onset, manifestation, course and outcome of mental illness is due in
part to the cross-cultural psychological conceptualization of culture, where culture is seen as
an independent variable influencing mental illness, the dependent variable. This is in addition
to the limitations of the biomedical model in accounting for the origins of mental illness. Using
depression and schizophrenia as examples, we argue for the need to see culture and mental
illness as mutually embedded in each other.
This article is available in Online Readings in Psychology and Culture: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol10/iss2/1
Case examples 
Case A 
A man who, until recently has been normal, suddenly began to behave in a bizarre way 
somewhere in South East Asia. His relatives suspected that he had lost his spirit, so 
they took him to the house of the local shaman. Upon careful examination, the shaman 
declared that indeed the man's spirit had left him. Soon afterwards, the man received lots 
of sympathy and was exempted from his usual social duties and work. Even though his 
behavior was viewed as bizarre, he was not sanctioned because he was seen as not been 
directly responsible for his strange behavior, but the departure of his spirit. After further 
examination involving an all-night ceremony with sacred chants where various deities were 
called upon to enter into the body of the shaman, the shaman identified who is responsible 
for the lost spirit. He offers animal sacrifice to appease the deities, and then begins 
"spirit-hooking" ritual in which his own spirit journeys on a magical flight to the land of the 
dead to track down the lost spirit. Once the lost spirit is tracked down, he is brought 
back and deposited in various food dishes, which the man had to eat in order to regain the 
lost spirit. The shaman also removes poisonous harms from the man body and his 
household, during which time the man had to remain in the shaman's house for closer 
observation. Once the shaman correctly identified the whereabouts of the lost spirit and 
the prescribed rituals and rites conscientiously followed for a couple of months, the lost 
spirit returned into the man and he eventually got well again. 
Case B 
A man who, until recently has been normal, suddenly began to behave in a bizarre way 
somewhere in Western Europe. His relatives suspected that he was sick, so they took 
him to a psychiatrist in the nearby hospital. Upon careful examination, the psychiatrist 
declared that the man indeed is sick. Soon afterwards, the man received lots of sympathy 
and was exempted from his usual social duties and work. Even though his behavior was 
viewed as bizarre, he was not sanctioned because he was seen as not been directly 
responsible for his strange behavior, but the sickness. After further careful examination 
including detailed medical history, psychological test results, and interviews, the 
psychiatrist came up with the diagnosis, and outlined the method for his treatment. 
These included different forms of psychotherapy and the use of some medications from 
the nearby pharmacy shop. While the man had to take the drug medication himself, the 
psychiatrist undertook the psychotherapy. The man also had to make some changes in 
some of his daily routines (e.g., being admitted in the hospital for some few days for closer 
observation). Once the psychiatrist correctly diagnosed the sickness and the prescribed 
therapy and drugs were carefully administered for a couple of months, the sickness was 
eventually eliminated and the man got well again. 
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Case C 
A man who, until recently has been normal, suddenly began to behave in a bizarre way 
somewhere in West Africa. His relatives suspected that an evil spirit possessed him, so 
they took him to the shrine of the local witch doctor. Upon careful examination, the witch 
doctor declared that the man indeed is possessed. Soon afterwards, the man received 
lots of sympathy and was exempted from his usual social duties and work. Even though 
his behavior was viewed as bizarre, he was not sanctioned because he was seen as not 
been directly responsible for his strange behavior, but the evil spirit. After further careful 
examination and interviews with close family members and friends, the witch doctor 
identified the evil spirit. He then gave instructions as to how the evil spirit should be 
exorcised. This involved different forms of rites and rituals, such as the drinking of 
different kinds of herbs from a nearby forest. Some of the rites involving animal sacrifices 
were performed by the man himself, and others on his behalf by his relatives. The man 
also had to make some changes in some of his daily routines (e.g., being kept in the 
shrine for some few days for closer observation). Once the witch doctor correctly identified 
the evil spirit and the prescribed rites and rituals were conscientiously followed for a 
couple of months, the evil spirit was eventually eliminated and the man got well again. 
Case D 
A man who, until recently has been normal, suddenly began to behave in a bizarre way 
somewhere in North Eastern Latin America. His relatives suspected that he has been 
voodooed (um trabalho de umbanda), so they took him to the "pai de santo" in the 
nearby "terreiro de macumba". Upon careful examination, the pai de santo declared that 
the man indeed was suffering from malefic influence sent from someone else who did not 
want him to be happy. Soon afterwards, the man received lots of sympathy and was 
exempted from his usual social duties and work. Even though his behavior was viewed as 
bizarre, he was not sanctioned because he was seen as not been directly responsible for 
his strange behavior, but the influence of malefic spirits. After further careful 
examination including the incorporation of different spirits that spoke through the "pai de 
santo", the pai de santo came up with the diagnosis, and outlined the method for his 
treatment. These included different forms of treatment, baths of herbs, lighting candles 
during the whole treatment and coming to the terreiro once a week for a session with the 
"pai de santo". Once the "pai de santo" correctly diagnosed the sickness and the 
prescribed baths, rituals with candle lightning and weekly sessions in the "terreiro" were 
carefully administered during a couple of months, the sickness was eventually eliminated 
and the man got well again. 
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From above case(s) discuss the following questions:  
 
1. What can be this bizarre behavior that resulted in the family seeking help from a 
local “expert” on this person’s behavior? 
2. What are the similarities and differences in the family's response and the manner of 
treatment to the bizarre behavior of the man? 
3. Is this “local expert” on bizarre behavior the same or different kind of person in the 
different regions presented in the case(s)? 
4. Are we dealing with the same or different phenomena? What makes you think so? 
5. From your background and perspective, can any one approach taken to deal with 
the man's bizarre behavior be more justified than the other, and if so which one? 
6. Can you think of reasons why "spirits" play such a dominant role in the examples 
drawn from all the regions presented here except Western Europe? To what extent 
are "spirits" responsible for one's "bizarre behavior" in your native society? 
7. What is the role or significance of culture in the different approaches taken here? 
8. Is it possible to see in the examples the mutual embeddedness of culture and 
mental illness? How? 
9. How will the man's bizarre behavior be explained and treated in an imaginary 
society that does not have culture? 
Introduction 
The last three questions introduce us to the crux of the present chapter, namely the 
inextricable relationship between culture and mental health problems. We believe it is 
inconceivable to imagine a society that does not have a culture, and equally 
incomprehensible to imagine how a society devoid of culture will deal with such a bizarre 
behavior. Without a “culture” we will not be in the position to determine what is bizarre, and 
the inability to determine what a “bizarre” behavior is also makes it difficult to know how it 
can be treated. In this article, we propose that culture should be seen as an inherent part 
of mental illness. Culture does not just influence mental health and illness; it is an essential 
part of it. Failure to see it as such leads to a myopic view of the onset, expression, course 
and prognosis of mental health problems. In this article, we will discuss how mental illness 
and culture are embedded in each other.  
In the first part of the article, we briefly present some theoretical orientations that 
dominate the field of the link between culture and behavior, followed by a brief review of 
current research in (cross-) cultural psychology relating to mental illness. Finally, we 
present a critique of the current research approaches to (cross-)cultural mental illness and 
the way forward. A recurrent issue in this chapter is the degree of universality of the 
expression of mental illness across cultures with reference to depression, schizophrenia, 
and culture-bound syndrome. 
A major challenge when discussing mental illness is that there are many different 
ways in which mental disorders can be classified, with no one way necessarily better or 
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more correct than the other (Thakker, Ward, & Strongman, 1999). This challenge comes to 
the fore because the experience of mental disorder is highly subjective, and making sense 
of it depends in part on how articulate the person with the disorder is in expressing his or 
her feeling, thoughts and the manner in which the behavioral aspects expressed are 
acceptable (or unacceptable) in the society in question (Angel & Williams, 2000).  
A closely related challenge is how to develop a reliable classification system. Mental 
disorders become prevalent at particular times and/or fade away with time because of 
cultural changes and new knowledge about disorders. Homosexuality is one such 
example, where this form of sexuality was removed from the diagnostic manuals in the 
1970s as a disorder. While homosexuality is an acceptable form of behavior in many 
Western countries, some sub-Sahara African countries, such Uganda considers it as 
abnormal and criminal, punishable by up to 14 years of incarceration (Wikipedia, 2011). 
Why are there such huge differences? Is it simply differences in cultural values or 
something else? 
Indeed, to understand mental illness is to understand culture and understanding 
culture makes mental illness comprehensible. The two concepts – culture and mental 
illness – are intrinsically linked to the extent that the definition of ill-health depends on the 
manner of being, and of thinking, or more specifically, on the culture (Bruner, 2001). 
Mental illness varies therefore in time and place. In the Western world, mental illness is 
conceptualized from a bio-medical model that is independent of culture. The biomedical 
model views mental illness to be  
fundamentally biological in origin, and … psychopathology [as] essentially 
homogeneous with only superficial variations in presentation across peoples 
(Thakker & Ward, 1998, p. 502). 
While the bio-medical approach to mental illness is linked to an individualist ideology 
where mental illness is diagnosed and treated as something purely individual, Marsella 
and Yamada (2000) are of the view that mental illness are very much rooted in ones 
culture, poverty, helplessness, and racism backed by powerful socio-political and 
economic structures. The concern with culture was recognized over a century ago by Emil 
Kraepelin (1904/2000), who is credited as the father of modern psychiatry, when he 
proposed the development of a comparative psychiatry. Nevertheless, the diagnosis and 
the treatment of mental illnesses, has to a large extent ignored the inherent role of culture 
to mental illness. The lack of cultural cognizance is amply clear in Berne’s (1956) position 
when he noted that  
major psychoses take the same form in many regions, regardless of race, 
physical environment, cultural background and socio-economic situation (p. 198). 
In cases where culture is taken into consideration, it is often marginalized and construed 
as an independent variable similar to the status given to culture in cross-cultural 
psychology with its inherent limitations (Moghaddam & Studer, 1997). The marginalized 
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status of culture to the understanding of mental illness is due in part to the dominant 
position medicine enjoys (Marsella & Yamada, 2000). As a scientific discipline, the bio-
medical ideology has been powerful enough to keep the diagnosis and treatment of mental 
illness in the biological realm. This area is also deeply linked to the use of psycho-
pharmaceutical drugs, which is of great economic interest to the large and ever growing 
pharmaceutical industries. 
Theoretical Orientations 
The appropriate way of studying human behavior has been a debatable issue for several 
centuries dating back to the time of Greek philosophers (Adamopoulos & Lonner, 1994). 
One side of the debate was laid down by Aristotle (384-322, BC, Metaphysica, 1062b 13 – 
translated by Wheelright, 1960) when he suggested that it was possible to objectively 
study human behavior devoid of culture and the influences of ones surroundings. The 
other side of the debate was evident in Protagoras stance in his suggestion that the 
conceptions and explanations that we generate about ourselves are intricately linked to 
our own experiences (Protagoras ca. 480-411 BC, – translated by Wheelright, 1960).  
This ancient debate has, in our present day, taken the form of whether in explaining 
psychological processes, we assume the existence of substantial commonalties in the 
psychological makeup (i.e., a psychic unity) of human beings, and commonalties in human 
experience and behavior (i.e., psychological universals). Or whether we assume that 
studying human behavior outside the context in which it occurs is impossible, and that 
behavior can best be understood in the context in which it occurs. This latter assumption is 
that behavior occurs within certain social environments or cultural contexts, and these 
need to be taken into consideration when studying behavior.  
While these discussions previously took the form of three categorical positions – 
absolutism, relativism and universalism (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002), Berry, 
Poortinga, Breugelsman, Chasiotis, and Sam (2011) currently conceptualize them along 
two dimensions because the positions are less polarized. The issue is the extent to which 
psychological functions and processes are common to humankind (i.e., universalism) and 
the extent to which they are unique to specific cultural groups (i.e., relativism).  
Absolutism 
The absolutist’s position assumed that human behavior is basically the same (qualitatively) 
in all cultures: ‘honesty’ and ‘depression’ are respectively ‘honesty’ and ‘depression’ 
irrespective of where one observed it (Berry & Sam, 2007). This position also assumed the 
existence of an “absolute truth” regarding human behavior and its manifestations, where 
culture was thought to play no part in either the connotation or demonstration of human 
characteristics. The absolutist position is currently seen as ethnocentric in perspective and 
its assumptions as only a logical possibility without any supporting evidence (Berry et al., 
2002).  
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Relativism 
The relativist position is rooted in anthropology, and is attributed to Herskovits (1948), 
although its roots come from Boas (1911). The position assumes that all human behavior 
is culturally patterned. One of its goals is to avoid all forms of ethnocentrism by trying to 
understand people in their own terms without placing any value judgments, and having 
preconceived ideas. This position seeks to avoid derogating, describing, categorizing, and 
understanding other people from an external cultural view point. Understanding people in 
their own terms entails using the group’s own categories and value system when the group 
is being described (Berry et al., 2002).  
In extreme forms of relativism (i.e., extreme relativism), all psychological reality is 
regarded to be dependent on one’s own understanding or interpretation. As such, so-
called “facts” derived from research are constructions that cannot reveal an objective 
reality outside of the person, as our understanding and interpretation inevitably entail some 
important distortions (Berry et al., 2011, p. 8). Many researchers accept the view that there 
are observable regularities in human behavior and that one’s interpretations are not 
entirely subjective. This acknowledgement has resulted in a milder form of relativism, 
referred to as “moderate relativism”. This form of relativism emphasizes that psychological 
functions and processes are the outcome of interactions between organism and socio-
cultural contexts in contrast to the extreme form of relativism described above.  
Universalism 
The third position – “moderate universalism” (to distinguish it from absolutism or extreme 
universalism) is a position lying between the absolutist and the (moderate) relativist 
positions. It assumes that basic human characteristics are common to all members of the 
species (i.e., constituting a set of biological givens), and that culture influences the 
development and display of basic human process. From this position, the meaning of 
behavior is dependent on the cultural context in which it occurs, while at the same time a 
behavior can also be understood in common terms across societies (in an objective way). 
The various theoretical positions entail different methodological approaches, but 
discussions of these are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
A main distinction between the moderate universalism and moderate relativism 
positions is that whereas the former position regards culture to be an exogenous force that 
exerts its influence on behavior and mental illness, the latter position sees culture as an 
integral part of human behavior and mental illness, and as inseparable. From both 
positions, one cannot speak of mental health illness without taking cognizance of culture; 
they both assume that culture shapes and defines normality and abnormality, and culture 
makes behavior comprehensible. From the position of moderate universalism, culture can 
be manipulated and studied objectively. This view fits very well with the bio-medical 
scientific model, and has therefore gained more credence, and has directed much of the 
research effort on mental illness, especially from cross-cultural psychological perspective. 
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Current (Cross-) Cultural Research in Mental Health 
Where is culture in depression? 
Depression is perhaps the single most common mental health problem affecting some 121 
million people globally. In 2000, depression was the leading cause of disability as 
measured by Years Lived with Disability, and was the 4th leading contributor to the Global 
Burden of Disease measured as Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) (WHO, 2011). 
Presently, depression is the 2nd cause of DALYs in the age category 15-44 years for both 
sexes combined. Considering its ubiquity, the disorder serves as a good illustrative 
example when discussing the role of culture on mental disorders, and its universality.  
The approach taken in many studies exploring this question is the use of 
standardized instruments exploring the extent to which different symptoms are present in 
different national groups who reportedly have depression or other forms of distress. A 
historical landmark in research on depression was a series of studies sponsored by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) between 1973 and 1986 (Draguns, 1990; Sartorius, 
1983). In addition to identifying some symptoms that were present in at least 75% of the 
samples in all the societies, the studies concluded that patients from Western countries 
tended to express guilt feelings more spontaneously than their non-Western counterparts. 
The latter group of patients, non-Western patients, on the other hand, reported bodily 
complaints more spontaneously. Interviewing 100 Chinese patients suffering from shenjing 
shuairuo – SRSJ – an abbreviation for shenjing shuairuo  (i.e., neurasthenia in ICD-10 
classification – WHO, 1992), Kleinman (1986) concluded that 93 of them might be 
suffering from depression based on DSM-III criteria. However, instead of spontaneously 
reporting dysphoria, ideas of insufficiency and the other well-known symptoms of 
depression, these SJSR or "depressed" patients spontaneously reported headaches 
(90%), sleep problems (87%), and dizziness (73%). In a study carried out almost two 
decades after Kleinman’s among 139 Chinese patients visiting a primary care unit (the 
very clinical setting as Kleinman’s study), Chang and her colleagues found that while 
30.6% and 22.4% of the SJSR patients could respectively be re-classified as suffering 
from DSM-IV category of Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorders and Somatoform pain 
disorders, nearly half (44.9%) did not qualify for a core DSM-IV diagnosis (Chang, Myers, 
Yeung, Zhang, & Zhao, 2005).  
These findings raise some critical questions about the universality of depression, 
whether, for instance, the Chinese patients were suffering from depression, SJSR or 
somatoform, as modern Western nosology would call it, following the spontaneous 
responses of headaches, dizziness, and the like. Does depression exist everywhere and 
share common symptoms? Where does Schieffelin's work (1985) fit with the universality of 
depression when in his 20-year work among the Kaluli people of New-Guinea he could not 
find a single case of what Westerns would call depression among them?  
A closely related question is whether somatoform and disorders such as SJSR are a 
particular cultural group’s way of expressing depressive disorders, or it is a separate form 
of disorder. Regarding the latter question, the notion of category fallacy becomes 
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important. This is the situation when researchers and clinicians impose the illness 
categories of their culture on other cultures. This fallacy underscores using an external 
point of view or another society’s categories to describe and/or classify people, something 
which relativism seeks to avoid. Here, universalism may be victim of category fallacy. 
Whereas Jadhav (1995) questions the validity and the appropriateness to use the 
term "depression" for symptom patterns that bear little resemblance to Western 
depression, Marsella (1980) is of the view that "depression does not assume a universal 
form" (p. 260), and that "the psychological representation of depression occurring in the 
Western world is often absent in non-Western societies" (p. 261).  
To assert that depression is universal, we should be able to logically account for the 
differences in symptom expression. To this regard, a number of theories have been put 
forward to do exactly that. These include aspects of family structure (extended families 
providing more elaborated social support, close mother-child relationships, and reduced 
risk of loss of loved ones); and mourning rituals (low depression may result from ritualized 
and overt expressions of grief).  
Marsella (1980) has also introduced the notion of a cultural dimension of "epistemic 
orientations", which involves objective vs. subjective orientations. In relatively "objective 
orientation” cultures, there is an abstract language, and individuated self-structure; in 
contrast, there is a metaphorical language and more communal structure in "subjective" 
types of culture. Depression, it is argued takes a primarily affective and cognitive form in 
cultures with objective orientations (and is experienced as a sense of isolation), while it 
takes a primarily somatic form in cultures with subjective orientations. 
In line with the WHO studies on depression, most observers (e.g., Tanaka-Matsumi 
& Draguns, 1997, p. 455) believe that, there is a "common core" of symptoms of 
depression (which includes anxiety, tension, lack of energy and ideas of insufficiency) 
allowing the disorder to be recognized in all cultures. In addition, there are some aspects 
of depression that may differ across cultures (e.g., more frequent somatic symptoms in 
some cultures: Ulusahin, Basoglu, & Paykel, 1994), and this may be rooted in the culture. 
In a phenomenological study that sought to understand the meaning of depression in 
Brazil, Chile, and the United States, Moreira, (2007a & b, 2008, 2009) did not find 
important variations in the symptoms in the three countries. However, the symptoms were 
related to the participants’ subjective cultural experiences. The symptoms were also 
related to cultural changes, including economic and psychosocial oppression in their life, 
and these contributed to the appearance and maintenance of their depression.  
In conclusion, what constitutes depression, and how it is expressed may be very 
much rooted in culture. The fact that some core symptoms have been identified in all the 
societies where the disorder has been examined, albeit some local variations in its 
expression, and the fact that these can be linked to some cultural beliefs, values and 
traditions of the society, make us concur with Berry and his colleagues (2011) that 
depression most likely is moderately universal. However, the frequent reliance on 
biomedical approaches to the study of depression, and the populations studied may have 
affected the conceptualizations of the disorder and thereby limited the conclusions that we 
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can be drawn. Acknowledging that culture is implicated in the disorder makes moderate 
relativism position also tenable, but more research is still needed. 
The case of schizophrenia  
Although much less common than depression, schizophrenia1 is the most debilitating 
mental disorder in the world. The disorder is highly stigmatized partly because of its poor 
prognosis2. In spite of evidence suggesting a biological etiology (e.g., Hall, Gogos & 
Karayiorgou, 2004) there is still lack of complete knowledge about the local prevalence 
rates and prognosis, as well as variations in symptom presentation (Tandon, Keshavan, & 
Nasrallah, 2008). Following Spiro's (1984) position that "thinking and feeling are often 
determined by culture" (p. 324), and the meaning of schizophrenia as "a split between 
thought and feeling", we are very likely to be limited in our understanding of schizophrenia 
(and nearly all other mental health problems) if culture is eliminated from the diagnostic 
equation. 
A phenomenological study of the experience of schizophrenia in Brazil and Chile 
with patients diagnosed with paranoiac schizophrenia in public psychiatric hospitals 
showed some important differences (Moreira, 2009; Moreira & Boris, 2006; Moreira & 
Coelho, 2003). While the meaning of the experience of bodily alterations (present in 
outbursts of schizophrenia) is attributed to brain illness in Chile, in Brazil the same 
experience is attributed to Umbanda (i.e., to spirits). However, no significant differences 
were found between the two groups of patients in relation to their sense of space. 
Over the years WHO has undertaken several major studies on the expression, 
course, and prognosis of schizophrenia in several countries, including Colombia, the 
former Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, India, Nigeria, the former Soviet Union, 
Thailand, and the United States. Using standardized instruments, researchers have 
identified a set of symptoms that were present across all cultures in the schizophrenic 
samples. Just like with the depression studies, symptoms as lack of insight, auditory and 
verbal hallucinations, and ideas of reference, are thought to be the “core” symptoms of 
schizophrenia. The WHO studies nevertheless found differences in symptom profiles from 
study center to study center, where for instance, schizophrenics in the USA differed from 
their Danish and Nigerian counterparts on the extent of how much they lacked insight and 
experienced auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenics in Nigeria also reported more of "other 
hallucinations" than the USA and Danish schizophrenics. Given this "common core" (and 
the partial reduction of variation in diagnosis when common instruments are employed), it 
could be argued that schizophrenia should be viewed as a moderate universal disorder, 
                                               
1
 The term ”schizophrenia” comes from Greek and literally translates as schizein, “splitting”; phren, 
“a breath and soul” and the suffix -ia, implies disease. 
2
 In 2002 the term for schizophrenia in Japan was changed from seishin-bunretsu-byo (disease of 
disorganized mind) to Tōgō-shitchō-shō (integration disorder) in order to reduce the stigma 
associated with the disorder, and hopefully improve prognosis (Kim & Berrios, 2001). Unlike in 
many Western societies where the original Greek meaning of the term is unknown, the term is 
very much embedded and implied in several Asian languages such as in Chinese and Japanese, 
and is readily understood by lay laymen. 
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and as a disorder that is recognizably present in all (studied) cultures, but the disorder 
appears to respond to different cultural experiences in prevalence rates and modes of 
expression.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding from the WHO studies is that patients from 
developing countries showed better prognosis compared with their peers in developed 
countries (Williams, 2003). However, the factors underlying the better outcome of 
schizophrenia in developing countries are still not fully understood. Jablensky (2000) 
points to interactions between genetic variation and specific aspects of the environment as 
one possible reason. Differences in prognosis have also been related to what constitutes 
stressors in different societies. A number of studies (e.g., Corcoran et al., 2003) have 
found a link between stress and the onset of schizophrenia and its relapse. A link has also 
been found between schizophrenia and more subtle everyday factors such as daily 
hassles (Norman & Malla, 1993). One form of daily hassles – expressed emotion (EE), 
which refers to family members’ negative emotional reactions to patients – may be 
relevant as a stressor in psychosis relapse in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia patients 
returning to families with high criticism and emotional involvement levels have about 50 
percent chance of relapse, compared with 15 percent in patients returning to low-EE 
families (Butzlaff & Hooley, 1998; Corcoran et al., 2003).  
Where do culture-bound syndromes fit? 
Culture-bound syndromes are patterns of behavior considered to be abnormal or 
psychopathological, and are found only in a particular cultural group. These disorders have 
not found their way into the main body of the diagnostic manuals widely used in western 
countries such as the ICD-10 (WHO, 1992). In the DSM-IV (APA-2000), examples of these 
syndromes can be found in the Appendix. One example of culture-bound syndrome is 
dhat, a semen-loss or semen-lacking anxiety disorder. The disorder refers to the clinical 
condition in which the patient is morbidly preoccupied with excessive loss of semen from 
an “improper form of leaking” such as nocturnal emissions, masturbation or urination. The 
underlying anxiety is based on the cultural belief that excessive semen loss will result in 
illness. The importance of semen can be discerned in Ayurvedic texts regarding the 
production of semen as:  
food converts to blood, which converts to flesh, which converts to marrow, and 
the marrow is eventually converted into semen. It . . . takes 40 days for 40 drops 
of food to be converted to one drop of blood, 40 drops of blood to one drop of 
flesh, etc. (Bhugra & Buchanan, 1989; cit. in Sumathipala, Siribaddana & Bhugra, 
2004, p. 204). 
Dhat-syndrome has been reported on the India sub-continent, and may be closely related 
to another culture-bound syndrome – koro (i.e., the genital-retraction anxiety disorder). 
Castillo (1991) has pointed out that western trained psychiatrists regard dhat-syndrome as 
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major depression. However, the majority of these patients (64%) have failed to recover 
when exclusively treated with anti-depressants (Singh, 1985).  
The biomedical tradition from the West with its underpinnings in universalist position 
assumes that mental health categories found in either the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) or ICD-10 
(WHO, 1992) apply to everyone, and those that are not readily recognized in the West are 
culture-bound syndromes. As such, the relatively lack of Anorexia nervosa in non-Western 
Asians has not sufficed to regard it as a culture-bound syndrome of the west, but a 
disorder with full-fledged status in the western diagnostic manuals. It is nevertheless 
important to note that the same diagnoses of mental illnesses may appear in different 
cultures, but their etiology may have different characteristics, as is the case with anorexia. 
In the West it is associated with a self-image of fatness and to the fear of becoming 
overweight, while in non-Western cultures anorexia has nothing to do with weight or body 
mass, but rather to religious beliefs linked to fasting for spiritual purification (Moreira, 
2007a). Against this background, should anorexia still qualify as a (moderate) universal 
disorder, or a culture-bound syndrome?  
A Critical Approach to the Problem 
Cross-cultural studies have in no doubt improved our understanding of culture and mental 
health. Nevertheless, there is an ever-increasing need to note that many of the studies 
done in this area are limited when it comes to measuring the incidence and the expression 
of the mental illness in the various regions of the world. This restricts the concept of culture 
simply to the idea of different countries or different regions in the world (Sloan, 2001). The 
nature of these studies has been caricatured as 
cross-cultural psychology has been quick to put on the white lab coat of the 
scientist as though it had forgotten about culture. It is clear that the researchers 
have not forgotten culture as an independent variable, as something that could be 
assumed to be a cause and affect behavior. But who knows that they neglect 
culture as the manufacturer of the 'mechanisms of central processing’ 
(Moghaddam & Studer, 1997, p. 197). 
Restricting the concept of culture to causal occurrence has serious ideological 
ramifications, albeit the cross-cultural researcher is seen as ideologically neutral. The 
question of neutrality is part of the limitation of traditional clinical psychology and 
psychiatry which, from within an individualist ideology, ignores the social, political and 
cultural contexts of those in need of psychological treatment. Many cases of mental illness 
diagnosed in day-to-day work in medical and psychological offices of the developing 
countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia question the neutrality of the treatment both 
from ethical and ideological points of view. This is particularly relevant when an illness, to 
a greater extent, is related to experiences of political violence and social oppression than 
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to biological factors to be treated in an individualist perspective of the problem. As Lira 
(2000) states, "neutrality is not ethically possible in such cases" (p. 85).  
According to Kleinman and Good (1985) one major limitation to gaining full 
realization of cross-cultural studies in psychopathology is the lack of a sophisticated 
anthropological view of culture. These authors emphasize the anthropological and relativist 
perspective in the studies of psychopathology, which resembles a phenomenological focus 
of research that searches for the meaning of an experience as lived out by the subject. 
Tatossian (1997) points out that a fundamental error in classical western cross-cultural 
psychiatry is its a-priori assumption that western psychiatric categories are universal, and 
that culture modifies the contents through a 'pathoplastic' action. The pathoplastic view of 
cultural roots of mental illness sees culture as antecedent to the individual. This view is 
different from the anthropological view of culture as an integral part of an individual’s 
make-up. As it is, "psychiatry" is the way Western society chooses to regulate the problem 
of its 'disorders'.  
However, there are other ways to do this where each culture could have its own 
"psychiatry" as our case examples at the start of the paper portray. The Western approach 
(i.e., psychiatry) should neither be seen as privileged nor as better than the other 
approaches involving the use of a shaman or a witch-doctor. It is also important to note 
that cultures can regulate the problems without constituting "psychiatry" or its equivalent, 
because the notions of mental illness, of etiology, and of treatment are not universal. 
One risk cross-cultural researchers take is to translate, adapt, and transport the 
methodology of psychological tests, with the aim of discovering universal truths through 
testing of hypotheses among groups from different cultures (Moghaddam & Studer, 1997; 
Moreira, 2009). This is both serious and questionable as it involves stripping the value, 
evidently of ideological character of the role of culture in the constitution of behavior, of 
mental health and mental illness. Rather than including issues of power and ideology into 
the concept of culture, culture is reduced to a simple independent variable that does not 
require any deeper thought about its meaning. Perspectives from critical psychology show 
that mainstream psychology is ideologically individualistic in nature and perpetuates a 
situation of inequality and social injustice (Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; Sloan, 2001).  
It would, however, be a great loss if those studies in cross-cultural psychology were 
to reinforce this perspective, when they themselves have the potential for critical 
understanding of mental health and illness, as well as psychology in general, at an 
anthropological, sociological and political level. Even though a critical approach of 
psychology recognizes its link to cultural studies (Sloan, 2001), the enormous critical 
potential of (cross-) cultural studies is lost when psychologists 'psychologize' the concept 
of culture and thus characterizes it as such. Consequently, studies that are limited 
measuring symptoms in different cultural settings flourish. 
While criticizing studies arguing that depression and schizophrenia to a large extent 
are based on the individualistic ideology in mainstream approaches of psychopathology, 
we acknowledge that these studies are cognizant of culture, albeit from a myopic view 
where culture is still “outside” the individual. Grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, we propose a “worldly” understanding for psychopathology (Moreira, 
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2002, 2007a & b, 2009,). In this perspective we regard human beings in a worldly way, 
defined through “multiple contours”, which interweave and mutually constitute themselves 
as expressed by Merleau-Ponty through Cézanne’s painting (Moreira, 2007c). 
 
Therefore, we defend the understanding of psychopathology not only as a field of 
study, but as the experience of mental pathology, necessarily including its cultural 
dimension, as well as the endogenous and situational dimensions that exist in mutual 
constitution (Moreira, 2002). When we propose that culture be understood as a constituent 
of mental health, it is important to recover not only the anthropological definition of the 
concept put forward by Kleinman and Good (1985) as the intersection of meaning and 
experience. It is equally important to transcend the concept by explicitly incorporating the 
inherent political aspects. This deals with a concept which is necessarily not naïve (Freire, 
2000) but de-ideologized (Martin-Baró, 1985). Culture as a fundamental constituent 
dimension of mental health deserves to be understood as an anthropological, historical, 
social, and political concept, including, fundamentally, an ideological discussion on its 
constituents. As Rovaletti (1996) affirms: 
one does not become crazy as he wishes, but rather as the culture foresees. At 
the heart of neurosis or psychosis, through which we try to escape, culture still 
tells us what personality of substitution we should adopt (p. 125). 
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Questions for Discussion 
1. Once culture is eliminated from the diagnostic equation, one loses the capacity to 
recognize important social and cultural variables involved in the etiology and 
manifestation of mental disorders. Discuss. 
2. Discuss how eliminating culture from mental illness will result in a limited 
understanding of the onset, manifestation, course and outcome of mental illness. 
3. All mental health problems should be viewed as a culture-bond syndrome. 
4. How ascertain whether an individual on a remote isolated place that your cultural 
group has never heard of before is suffering from depression or schizophrenia? 
5. To what extent can we assume that the core symptoms of depression and 
schizophrenia identified by the WHO studies are "culturally neutral"? 
6. Identify some aspects of your own culture that could be constituents of mental 
illness. Discuss how these aspects may influence mental illness. 
7. Discuss the difference between the idea of culture influencing mental illness 
against the mutual embeddedness of culture and mental illness. 
8. Choose a mental illness as described in the DSM-IV or ICD-10 and discuss it 
onset, expression and prognosis from your cultural point. 
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